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ABSTRACT
Piggybacking, an early form of strategic alliances, as a
strategic alternative to serve foreign markets is discussed in
this paper. Hypothesis related to the conditions under which
piggybacking is a preferred strategy for riders and carriers are
proposed. The implications of piggybacking for developing
countries are also discussed.

The name "strategic alliance" is a terra of the 1980s. It
describes a development of the 1980s also, that is the growing number
of ad hoc cooperations between firms who seek, to achieve some of their
strategic goals by allying themselves with partners who can complement
their own strengths and weaknesses. Because we are living in an
increasingly global market place, many, if not most, of these stra-
tegic partnerships are between firms in different countries. Thus
it is largely an international business phenomenon. It is also an
appropriate form of internationalization for small and medium sized
firms
.
Firms going international have long had various forms of cooper-
ation or relations across national boundaries. When they did not go
it alone abroad by establishing their own foreign production and/or
marketing, they worked with distributors, licensees, or joint venture
partners in the foreign market. Such forms of cooperation or alliance
are long established and not generally what is considered by the new
terra—strategic alliance. The strategic alliances of the 1980s are
generally characterized by a variety of ad hoc, non-equity agreements
(Terpstra 1985; Permutter and Heenan 1986). They are certainly not
internalization as normally understood, but are between internal-
ization and arm's length. Of course, licensing agreements and joint
ventures have common elements and motivations with the more modern
strategic alliances. Indeed, Porter groups them together in his
analysis in Competition in Global Industries (1986).
From the firm's point of view, the critical factor in the inter-
national cooperation is probably not whether there is an equity tie
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but rather whether the partner has the appropriate complementary
contribution to make and whether acceptable arrangements can be made.
In any case, our purpose here is not to get involved in the semantics
of strategic alliances but to discuss an old and early form of
strategic partnering
—
piggybacking. Piggybacking is a non-equity
arrangement wherein one producer markets the products of another pro-
ducer. The first producer—the carrier in this case
—
performs as
a distributor in marketing the products of the second producer—the
rider. The fact that the rider's products are being distributed by
another producer may bring important benefits to the rider as compared
with using a regular distributor.
Piggybacking has been used by firms to serve the domestic market
as well as to serve foreign markets. For example, Zenith recently
signed a marketing agreement with Hewlett-Packard to sell its portable
computers in the U.S. In this paper, we discuss piggybacking as a
strategy to serve foreign markets. We organize the paper as follows.
Section I explains what piggybacking is. Section II presents the
rationale for using piggybacking. Section III summarizes the results
of case analyses. Section IV demonstrates the advantage of piggy-
backing to firms from developing countries. The last section is the
conclusion.
PIGGYBACKING: NATURE AND FORMS
In piggybacking, firms join together voluntarily—usually no
equity-tie— to reach some objectives together that they cannot reach
efficiently by themselves. The relationship in piggybacking between
two parties is closer than arm's length but short of a formal joint
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venture or merger. Because piggybacking is also a form of cooperation
in exporting, it has something in common with Export Management
Companies, Export Trading Companies, and Webb-Pomerene Associations
(Terpstra 1987).
Piggybacking connotes "carrying on ones' back" and involves two
(or more) parties—the carrier and the rider. The carrier uses its
overseas distribution facilities to sell the rider's products along
with its own products. In this arrangement, depending on the agree-
ment, the products can carry either the carrier's or the rider's brand
name. A major motive for both parties is the attainment of economies
of scale in one or more aspects of the international marketing task
but they may also have other complementary motives. The relationships
may be dissolved due to internal or external changes. This is similar
to self-enforcing agreements, where two parties will keep the agree-
ment effective as long as each party believes himself to be better off
by continuing the agreement than by ending it (Telser 1980).
The rider and the carrier each has its own reasons for piggyback-
ing. The rider relies on piggybacking to take advantage of the
carrier's knowledge of the host country or the carrier's distribution
system in the host country. At the same time, the carrier needs the
rider's products to expand its product line. Thus, the alternative
to piggybacking for both parties is to develop that product (service)
or meet that need internally. Therefore, in forming a piggybacking
relationship, each party receives some personal gain by going together
as compared with going it alone.
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Market Coverage
The market coverage of a piggyback arrangement can vary from one
country to global markets. Many arrangements are a one country piggy-
back agreement. That is probable when there is a large market that is
particularly attractive for the rider firm and it doesn't have any
marketing organization of its own to reach that market. It is also
probable when the market has high entry barriers. Whirlpool used Sony
only in Japan, for example. Perrier marketed the Swiss Chocolate
Lindt only in the U.S. Breck Shampoo used Schick only in Germany.
Champion Spark Plug used a Nanjing spark plug manufacturer to dis-
tribute its products only in China. ATT used Toshiba just for the
Japanese market whereas Hitachi used NAS only for the U.S. market.
WYKO Corporation is a small Arizona producer of precision optical test
instruments. It wanted to reach the large but difficult Japanese
market. It chose to piggyback with Panasonic (Matsushita Electric).
It found Matsushita's market coverage and prestige in Japan was most
helpful. In a similar vein, Uniflow, which had successfully exported
to Europe, Africa and Latin America was unable to enter Japan until it
piggybacked with Panasonic.
Other piggyback arrangements may have multi-country coverage,
either regional or global. As a carrier, Borg Warner prefers global
markets. "Otherwise only the plums get picked." The carrier firm may
have good marketing coverage in many countries of a region that is
attractive to the supplier firm which again may lack the marketing
organization or resources or face high entry barriers. For example,
Fujitsu used Siemens to cover Western European countries in computers.
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Champion Spark Plug offered marketing coverage in Southeast Asia for
several Australian and European auto parts makers.
In yet other cases, the rider firm may wish to cover all or most
foreign markets by piggybacking with a well established global
marketer around the world. Some multinational firms have such
extensive global market coverage and industry expertise that they
provide a most desirable carrier firm partner. Sankyo Seiki, a
robotics firm, used the global coverage of IBM, as did Stratus mini-
computers. Kyocera took advantage of Philips worldwide marketing in
telecommunications equipment.
Reciprocal Piggybacking
Another dimension or form of piggybacking is reciprocal piggy-
backing . Manufacturers which have good market coverage in their own
country may look for a counterpart in a major foreign market or region
of interest to them. This is mostly likely in the Triad
countries—Europe, Japan, and the U.S.—where the markets are very
attractive but have rather high entry barriers. An American auto com-
ponent producer offers U.S. market coverage to a European producer of
a complementary component. The European firm reciprocates by offering
Western European markets to the American firm. ATT and Olivetti had
such a reciprocal piggyback arrangement covering the U.S. and Europe.
These reciprocal ties can strengthen the relations between the piggy-
back partners as they are doubly tied together.
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Product Coverage
Product coverage is another variabLe in piggybacking. A rider
firm may choose to piggyback one or a few of its products or its whole
product line. Of course, the desires of the carrier will also affect
the product choice. A firm may have just one or a few products with
foreign market potential. Or a firm may have a product that requires
a different marketing approach from the rest of its line. .American
Cyanamid is a chemical company but one of its products, Breck Shampoo,
is a consumer product. In the German market Breck piggybacked with
Schick, a consumer marketer. Similarly DuPont , which has an extensive
international industrial marketing network for chemicals, piggybacked
its consumer product, Reveal Wrap with Colgate's extensive inter-
national consumer marketing network. In Thailand, DuPont markets its
own industrial chemicals but piggybacks its agrocheraicals with Shell
and Union Carbide.
Other firms in different situations may piggyback all, or a large
part of their product line. Firms which engage in reciprocal piggy-
backing are likely to carry as many complementary, non-competing
products from their partner as have an opening in their market.
Smaller firms with narrow product lines and limited resources are
likely to piggyback as many of their products as the carrier will
take. For example, WYKO offers all of its precision optical test
instruments to Matsushita (Panasonic) for the Japanese market, and
Uniflow does the same with its full line of iceraaking and beverage
cooling equipment.
-7-
WHY PIGGYBACKING?
Theories of multinational enterprise suggest that if a firm has
some competitive advantages, under certain circumstances, it will
internalize them to exploit economic rent. In piggybacking, a rider
firm utilizes the market channels of the carrier firm instead of
internalizing or developing its own channels. In this context, the
rider relies on the carrier to sell its products and the carrier
relies on the rider to provide the new products. The apparent reason
for piggybacking is that the transaction cost is lower for each party
than developing the products or channels by itself.
A firm basically can use three modes to serve a foreign market:
exporting, foreign direct investment, and licensing. Assuming that
the rider is in the early stage of internalization, it is not feasible
to own production facilities in a host country. (Rider firms are
frequently smaller firms.) Assume also that its technology can
generate more profits than can be gained by licensing (Rugman 1981).
This precludes the possibility of investing in foreign countries as
well as licensing the technology to foreign firms. With respect to
exporting, the rider has several alternatives, such as direct export-
ing, Export Management Companies, Export Trading Companies, Webb-
Pomerene Associations, and piggyback. We emphasize the motivations
of piggybacking from the rider's perspective in relation to direct
exporting for three reasons. First, the advantages and disadvantages
of Export Management Companies have been addressed (Brasch 1978; Bello
and Williamson 1985) and serious problems exist in this approach.
Piggybacking is better than this mode as long as a company can find an
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appropriate carrier. Second, domestic firms have been slow to form
Export Trading Companies since the U.S. government passed the law in
1982 (Brevetti 1983). Firms are still in the early stage of famil-
iarizing themselves with this export mechanism. Third, Webb-Pomerene
Associations are not a major factor in exporting activities. For
example, there were 36 registered associations in 1981, with limited
product coverage. It is relatively unimportant as a vehicle of
exporting (Terpstra 1987). And lastly, piggybacking has been over-
looked by the literature.
The carrie r is usually a large firm with considerable inter-
national business and international experience. It may have plants as
well as distribution facilities in several countries. Its decision to
carry the rider's products will be compared with the alternative of
developing the new products by itself.
The Rider's Perspective
We compare two modes of serving foreign markets: direct exporting
and piggybacking. In direct exporting, the tasks of market contact,
marketing research, physical distribution, export documentation,
pricing, and so on, all fall on the export department of a firm.
Though direct exporting gives more control to a firm on its foreign
marketing activities than does indirect exporting, such as piggy-
backing, the costs and investment needed are much higher than those of
indirect exporting. These costs can be a significant entry barrier to
the small firm.
In order to support the investment incurred by direct exporting, a
firm should possess the following characteristics:
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• It has a reasonable volume of international business.
• It has the resources in terms of capital and personnel.
• It has local knowledge (knowledge of the host country, or at
least some experience of international marketing).
• It has Che capability of managing foreign distribution.
A direct exporting approach would be less viable if the firm is lacking
some of the above characteristics (Reid 1983). With piggybacking, none
of the above conditions is necessary. In piggybacking, producing
quality products and finding firms to carry the products are Che only
requirement. The marketing cost involved is domestic marketing. That
is why, for firms with limited exporting activities, limited resources,
and lack of foreign market knowledge, piggybacking is a good alter-
native. Even for firms with an established overseas marketing neC-
work, Che opporCunicy cose involved and enCry barriers associaced wich
markeCing a parCicular produce may corapell ic Co engage in piggybacking
agreemenC wich anocher manuf accurer , as we saw in several examples
earlier.
A disCribuCor or ocher Crading inCermediary will ofcen carry
several compecing produces and show no parCicular supporc for any one
of Chem. A piggyback carrier will carry only produces ChaC are
compleraenCary Co Chose of Che rider. Because produces receive
focussed selling Co Che appropriaCe markec segmencs, beCCer sales
performance and markec feedback are expecCed. A piggyback carrier
will ofcen be a firm wich a scrong brand name for ics line of
produces. Occasionally it will put its brand on the compleraenCary
produce of Che rider. IBM did chis wich copiers from MinolCa and
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Stratus minicomputers, for example. This can aid market acceptance of
the rider's product in a more forceful way than a distributor can.
Whirlpool illustrates other advantages of the carrier-producer
over conventional intermediaries. Whirlpool was distributing ap-
pliances in Japan via a Japanese trading company. In the mid-1970s
Whirlpool switched to Sony, a producer, as its Japanese distributor
and found a substantial increase in sales. Sony was happy to have
Whirlpool's white goods as complementary appliances to round out its
appliance line. In Japan, Sony operates its own very extensive
network, of retail outlets which was now made available to Whirlpool.
Whirlpool was thus able also to piggyback on the strong prestige of
the Sony image in Japan by being sold in Sony outlets. Sony also has
a strong service operation and reputation in Japan. Whirlpool was
now able to benefit from this association too. In this way,
Whirlpool, by moving from a trading company distributor to a piggyback
arrangement with Sony, was able to realize several significant
benefits which led to increased sales.
The Whirlpool-Sony example illustrates an important dimension of
piggybacking—it is not limited to physical distribution. The carrier
can also supply or cover most ingredients of the marketing mix.
Generally the rider supplies the basic product while the carrier per-
forms the marketing research, promotion, distribution, and inter-
national pricing tasks. The carrier may also lend its brand name and
service organization and even supply or fulfill the warranty. For
example, Sony and GE supplied warranty and service for Whirlpool and
Hitachi-Seiki respectively.
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Piggybacking is a dynamic process for the rider. A firm can build
on its international marketing expertise through piggybacking. This
points out that piggybacking may be a transitional strategy. Over
time, the rider may switch to another mode to serve foreign markets
when it accumulates enough international marketing experience.
Eventually the benefits generated by piggybacking may be lower than
another mode.
The rider has to invest in research and development to upgrade and
improve the products or to reduce the cost of production because this
the main concern of the carrier. The carrier may be able to turn to
another supplier with better products or lower costs. Because the
carrier is only interested in selling the products, not manufacturing
them, the carrier will be less concerned about the possibility of
losing its competitive advantages. To ensure the carrier's commitment
to the agreement, the rider has to be a reliable supplier of product
and should avoid the temptation of sacrificing exporting for domestic
needs.
The Carrier's Perspective
The carrier has two alternatives when wanting to add new products
to its existing product line: developing new products itself or
buying products from markets. Its decision to buy a product from the
market should be based on sound reasons. To be able to develop and
produce a new product, the firm should possess the following capabili-
ties :
• It has the knowledge, either in product development or in produc-
tion. The implicit assumption is that the firm should have some
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experience related to the new product. It can buy the knowledge
from the market but it takes some time to fully grasp the
knowledge.
• It has the resources to do the new job and the opportunity cost
should be lower than other activities.
Suppose a firm, after evaluation, decides to go with the buy-product
alternative. It then has two considerations. First, the new product
should be complementary to the existing product line. It is not
necessary to buy a competing product because the firm can develop it
internally and it would not want an unrelated product because the
existing channels may not be able to carry it. A firm should seek
products which utilize its existing channels and which appeal to the
same market segments. Second, the carrier wants to add a new product
quickly and thus the timing of the new product introduction becomes
important. The carrier may use this product to capture new market
opportunities or to compete with competitors which offer a similar
product. Because piggybacking is one of the ways to achieve this
objective with minimum investment and maximum speed it will be
seriously considered by the carrier. Another way for the carrier to
get a new product is through a licensing agreement. However, licens-
ing involves a greater commitment of investment in production. Also,
licensing is apt to be a longer commitment.
Through piggybacking the carrier can utilize excess capacity in
its international marketing operation and leverage its marketing
strengths across a wider product line. The carrier also gets a more
complete line more quickly and cheaply than by developing the new
products. R&D savings can be as important as the time saved. It
saves the factory investment of producing new products. It avoids
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some of the commercial and technical risks of new product introduction
because the rider's product has already been technically and com-
mercially tested in the home market. Firms with seasonal or cylical
sales may piggyback to keep their marketing and distribution organi-
zation employed.
The attractions of piggybacking, however, must be weighed against
other concerns. One is quality control. Will the supplying firm, the
rider, maintain adequate product quality? Most firms feel more com-
fortable with their ability to control the quality of products made in
their own facilities. Another potential concern is reliability and
continuity of supply. Will the supplier favor its own marketing needs
in tight demand conditions? Will the supplier tend to replace the
carrier once the carrier has successfully introduced its product into
foreign markets? If the supplier firm is small or if it has a narrow
product line in the relevant product markets, this latter concern may
not be a problem. The carrier's experience, investment, and economies
of scale may provide an entry barrier that is too great and costly for
the rider firm to overcome. Besides, the carrier may be able to find
other capable suppliers of similar products.
It is clear that the carrier has a narrower list of objectives
then the rider. The complementary input needed by the carrier is
generally a specific product or a wider product line which can be
marketed through the existing marketing system utilizing the excess
capacity of the carrier. This excess capacity is not limited to
distribution but may be in brand name goodwill or in advertising, per-
sonal selling, or facilities for credit or service. The economies and
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strength of the carrier will not be easily imitated by the rider. If
the rider decides to separate, the loss to the carrier is limited.
It can usually find similar products provided by other producers.
Because the rider provides a domestically proven product to the
carrier, the odds of success in foreign markets are also higher.
CASE EXAMPLES
We have examined about 65 observations of piggyback situations.
They are drawn from the business press in the 1970s and 1980s, espe-
cially Wall Street Journal
,
Fortune
,
Business Week
, and Business
International . Twenty-five observations come from the mid-1980s and
were drawn from a database, which contains more than 600 observations
on strategic alliances that one of the authors has been constructing
and working on. We did not do any statistical analysis of the piggy-
back observations because the information needed for this kind of
analysis is not complete for some observations. However, these obser-
vations gave us some insight and helped us in conceptualizing and
proposing hypotheses. In this section, we discuss two cases with a
little more detail to illustrate the piggybacking activities. We also
present the hypothesized conditions under which piggybacking is a pre-
ferred strategy.
Sony and U.S. Companies (Business International, 1974)
In Spring of 1972, Sony put ads in the U.S. media to solicit
piggybacking partners. Then Sony set up Sony International
Housewares (SIH) to market the products of eight U.S. companies in
Japan. SIH drew primarily on experienced people from Sony's TV and
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radio marketing group. Most of these people had contacts in the
appropriate retail outlets.
From Sony's point of view, with minimum cost, it could carry
complementary products which were compatible with its marketing capa-
bilities. From the U.S. companies' point of view, they enjoyed the
following benefits:
• Local knowledge needed to promote sales
• Social and cultural differences made it difficult for foreign
firms to design an effective marketing mix to appeal to local demands.
With the help of SIH, U.S. companies were in a better position to
attract local consumers.
• Distribution channels and service networks
One of the major reasons for the failure of foreign companies to
penetrate the Japanese market is its unique channel structure (Ross
1983). With the help of an established Japanese firm, U.S. companies
could reach customers with a better distribution network.
• The brand image of Sony
With the backing of a Japanese company known for its quality pro-
ducts and service, an unfamiliar foreign brand was more likely to be
accepted by local consumers.
Source Perrier S. A. and European Companies (Wall Street Journal 1984)
Source Perrier S. A., a spring-water bottler, made its American
subsidiary, Perrier Group, the exclusive importer-distributor for two
smaller European firms in the U.S. market. These two firms produced
chocolate and fruit preserve respectively. Source Perrier S. A. had
two reasons to market these products. First, it had only one product
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in the U.S. and thus a rather high cost marketing operation (dis-
economies of scale). Second, it chose products which appealed to the
same kinds of consumers who drank Perrier so that it could use the
same marketing approach to market the new products. The two riders
received the following benefits:
• They found a capable agent who could market their products in a
rich market place.
• Lacking the resources to engage in exporting activities by
themselves, they could benefit inexpensively from Perrier's
established capability.
• They were learning international marketing from Perrier.
These two cases demonstrate the motivations or gains to the rider
as well as the carrier. We have found from our case analyses that
small firms and large firms are both increasingly interested in this
strategy, from WYKO and Uniflow to IBM and Panasonic. One reason is
that in order to achieve the goal of market diversification and to
enter foreign markets quickly and effectively, many firms will have to
team up with other firms. We hypothesize that under certain condi-
tions, a firm will be inclined to be a carrier or a rider. The con-
ditions under which a firm prefers to be a rider are the following:
• Diversifying geographically very quickly (Ayal and Zif 1979)
• Limited resources to engage in direct exporting
• Small volume of international business
• Limited knowledge about foreign markets
• Entering some special segments with high entry distribution
barriers
• Ability to test foreign markets inexpensively
• Learning international marketing as a preparation for future
exporting activities
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The conditions which encourage a firm to become a carrier are the
following:
• Providing a new product with minimum investment and releasing
resources for other purposes
• Seeking complementary products to appeal to the same market
segments
• Fully utilizing excess foreign marketing capacity
• Quickly introducing a new product to compete with competitors
IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
For firms from developing countries, piggybacking poses a very
useful and effective way to break into foreign markets, especially
those in developed countries. These firms, usually with limited
resources and international marketing experience, have to face strong
competition and high entry barriers in foreign markets. Researchers
have suggested that a tie-in with a major multinational firm would be
an effective way for these firms to overcome these problems (Ayal,
1981). Piggybacking then becomes a viable strategic alternative for
these firms to enter the international arena. Because the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is a newcomer to international markets, we
will use it as an example to demonstrate how firms from developing
countries can exploit the advantages of piggybacking.
Being centrally planned, the Chinese economy has been operated as
a seller's market, where virtually any product has a guaranteed sale.
It is not only international marketing that is a new experience for
the Chinese. Even domestic marketing by producers is a new phenome-
non. Hence, the Chinese manufacturing firms started with almost no
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international marketing expertise when the government adopted the
"open door" policy in 1979. Like other developing or communist coun-
tries, China as a country currently is still at Che beginning stages
of international marketing and is rather unskilled and unsophisticated
at it.
Three major problems for firms from developing countries in com-
peting internationally are lack of foreign market knowledge, brand
image, and distribution channels. Firms from the PRC also face these
problems
.
Being from a developing Communist country that was relatively
closed until recently, Chinese producers are especially uninformed
about world markets—especially in developed countries. Developing
countries have different consumption patterns and marketing systems
from developed countries. Their firms cannot extrapolate from
domestic experience in marketing to OECD markets. A good solution
to this deficiency is to piggyback with producers from OECD markets.
These OECD firms can provide appropriate product specifications. Many
firms from Europe, Japan and the U.S. have interests or operations in
China. They provide available and natural piggyback partners for
Chinese producers as they begin their education in international
marketing. It is not surprising that many Chinese producers are using
the piggyback approach.
Chinese products are newcomers to international markets, with no
established name and reputation. Therefore, brand identification is
critical for them to overcome the problem of consumer ignorance and
fear about products from unfamiliar producers in the PRC. Besides
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this, the country-of-origin effect is another salient factor which
tends to work negatively toward products from China. In order to
overcome these problems, the Chinese have been trying to rely on the
well known foreign brands of established manufacturers to push their
products. For example, sports shoes made in China but sold in the
U.S. carry the name of Nike. This is a typical case of piggybacking.
Similarly, radios made in China but sold abroad carry the name of
Sanyo.
Overcoming international distribution problems is another reason
for Chinese firms to use foreign piggyback partners. Chinese pro-
ducers, like most others in developing countries, tend to have little
or no international marketing network or knowhow. They depend largely
on indirect exporting to serve foreign markets. In this case, they
sell products to buyers in China who then distribute and promote these
products in foreign markets. American, European, Japanese firms and
overseas Chinese are the major international distributors. For
example, Yamaha is distributing motorcycles for the Chinese. Through
this piggybacking approach, the Chinese can avoid the long delay and
huge investment of building up their own distribution networks and try
to get some initial experience of international marketing.
CONCLUSION
We have discussed the merits of piggybacking from the perspective
of the rider as well as the carrier. Piggybacking provides a strate-
gic alternative to large firms, small firms, and firms from developing
countries to serve foreign markets. It can be especially attractive
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to the latter two groups. We also specify the conditions under which
piggybacking is a preferred mode.
Piggybacking provides several benefits to the parties involved.
The rider may seek to use its carrier's skills and resources in inter-
national financing and credit; exporting, shipping, documentation and
insurance; foreign distribution, including entry to foreign markets
and distribution channels within foreign markets; service facilities
abroad; and promotional facilities abroad
—
personal selling, adver-
tising, or brand name. There is a narrower list of objectives to the
carrier. The main one is that it can get a reliable product to
complement its existing products very quickly with no production
investment
.
Piggybacking arrangements usually have a finite life. They can
lead to joint ventures or acquisitions, something stronger than the
partial marriage of piggybacking. The parties may also agree to a
separation, amicable or otherwise, as conditions change or one party's
needs or objectives change. While piggyback arrangements are func-
tioning, however, they can offer an efficient economic collaboration
with important benefits for each party—a true strategic alliance.
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